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[T]hrough a curious transposition peculiar to our times—it is 
innocence that is called upon to justify itself. 
Albert Camus1 
INTRODUCTION 
The metaphor “intimate enemy” best captures the changing nature 
of international law vis-à-vis nations. “Intimate enemy” is a useful 
heuristic device that could be deployed to capture legal concepts of 
indeterminacy, dialectics, and reformulation within international law. 
The United Nations Charter of 1945 aims primarily at saving, 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . reaffirm[ing] 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom.2 
Developing countries since then have mostly been backbenchers 
within the international legal system given their dismal compliance 
with human rights norms and high protectionism in international 
trade. Furthermore, since the formation of the United Nations, 
international organizations have taken form in a myriad of 
memberships such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States (ACP), Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración, 
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. 
Empirically, the participation of developing and least developed 
 
1 ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT 4 (Anthony Bower 
trans., 11th ed. 1978) (1951). 
2 U.N. Charter preamble. 
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countries in international legal systems has increased multi-fold. With 
the rise in the participation of non-Western nations, international law 
began to change its overall relationship with nations. There is a 
gradual but unmistakable swap of positions. 
This Article calibrates the relationship of international law vis-à-
vis developed, developing, and least developed nations by deploying 
the metaphor of “intimate enemy.” Given the lack of sufficient non-
Western academics and institutions in the field of international law, 
there exists a less than robust view on the relationship of international 
law with developing and least developed countries. Thus, this Article 
deploys the metaphor of “intimate enemy” to: 
1. Unpack the non-compliance of international law by Western 
nations 
2. To show that there is a growing trend among non-Western 
nations towards compliance. 
International law—so far as it is a set of legal doctrines animated 
by the spirit of global solidarity, world peace, and Laissez-faire 
policy—has begun to threaten the old position of developed countries. 
In a new environment, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries 
have taken away part of the influence from the developed countries. 
This fundamentally alters the relationship of countries with 
international law. This Article seeks to expose the politics of 
knowledge production and marketing that hides this dynamic in the 
service of a perception that non-Western countries are the worst 
violators of international law. The scale of intimate animosity works 
both ways; it maps the decline in international law’s compliance by 
Western nations as well as a growth in its compliance by non-Western 
nations. 
Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal’s dissent3 that famously absolved all 
the Japanese defendants in Tokyo Tribunal of all guilt, according to 
Kirsten Sellars, was an articulation of a “third-worldist sentiment.”4 
Indeed it was also the start of an international legal advocacy in 
postcolonial ink. The first wave of postcolonialism marked the birth 
of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). However, 
having transgressed the limits of conditions and riding the wave of 
globalization today, many see the Arab Spring and other 
 
3 See generally International Tribunal for the Far East: Dissenting Opinion of Justice 
Pal (1953). 
4 Kirsten Sellars, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1085, 
1095 (2011). 
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advancements in developing countries as blowing away 
postcolonialism.5 Nonetheless, the first phase of the discovery of self-
worth among developing countries came within a postcolonial 
vocabulary. In fact, within the legal literature postcolonialism is still 
alive as a methodology of deconstruction.6 
Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul pens about Salim—the hero of his 
novel, A Bend in the River—in postcolonial ink.7 Salim’s background 
is rather international and interesting. His forefathers came from 
Gujarat—the home province of Gandhi. “My family was Muslim,” 
declares Salim, and “in our customs and attitudes we were closer to 
the Hindus of northwestern India. . . . All that I know of our history 
and the history of the Indian Ocean I have got from books written by 
Europeans.”8 
If I say that our Arabs in their time were great adventurers and 
writers; that our sailors gave the Mediterranean the lateen sail that 
made the discovery of the Americas possible; that an Indian pilot 
led Vasco da Gama from East Africa to Calicut; that the very word 
cheque was first used by our Persian merchants—if I say these 
things it is because I have got them from European books. 
[However,] [t]hey formed no part of our knowledge or pride.9 
And Salim throws the salvo at the politics of knowledge creation 
rather innocuously: “Without Europeans, I feel, all our past would 
have been washed away, like the scuff marks of fishermen on the 
 
5 See HAMID DABASHI, THE ARAB SPRING: THE END OF POSTCOLONIALISM xvii 
(2012) (“We have now entered the phase of documenting in what particular terms that 
world is transcending itself, overcoming the mystified consciousness into which it was 
colonially cast and postcolonially fixated.”). Shashi Tharoor makes similar claims in his 
book, PAX INDICA: INDIA AND THE WORLD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (2012). 
Post-1991, Tharoor says, “the post-colonial chip has fallen off” India’s shoulder. Id. 
6 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739 (2006) (“The colonial and postcolonial realities of 
international law have been obscured and misunderstood as a consequence of a persistent 
and deep seated set of ideas that has structured traditional scholarship on the history and 
theory of international law. This article seeks to identify these structures, suggesting ways 
in which they have limited the understanding of the relationship between imperialism and 
international law.”). Tayyab Mahmud, Law of Geography and the Geography of Law: A 
Post-Colonial Mapping, 3 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 64 (2011). James Gathii talks about anti-
colonial reconstructions of international legal history. See James Thuo Gathii, 
International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EURO. J. INT’L L. 184, 187 (1998) (“I Identify this 
form of anti-colonial International legal scholarship as strong because of the centrality its 
analysis places on the claims and role of economic, political, social and cultural 
superiority/inferiority in the historical relationship of colonized and colonizing countries in 
the past and the present.”). 
7 V.S. NAIPAUL, A BEND IN THE RIVER 11 (1979). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 11–12. 
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beach outside our town.”10 Naipaul is very sarcastic in speaking 
through Salim. At the same time he exposes the problem that 
international law faces, the problem of the absence of native voices, 
the enigma of an authentic Other’s worldview. International law today 
deepens the problem still further; it is about the ability that powerful 
actors have to co-opt resistance by the Others within international 
law.11  
Unfortunately, it is only through borrowed glasses that one begins 
to see oneself.12 The postcolonial international law is one such 
borrowed glass.13 But then this enemy has become intimate; at the 
base of this intimacy is a live-in relationship between the developing 
countries and international law after 1945 that—as Bhabha would 
say—is an offspring of the productivity of colonial power. 
In order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is 
crucial to construct its regime of ‘truth’, not to subject its 
representations to a normalising judgement. Only then does it 
become possible to understand the productive ambivalence of the 
object of colonial discourse; that ‘otherness’ which is at once an 
object of desire and derision, is an articulation of difference 
contained within the fantasy of origin and identity. What such a 
reading reveals are the boundaries of colonial discourse and it 
enables a transgression of these limits from the space of that 
otherness.14 
Decolonization was succeeded by the birth of a “predominant 
liberal notion of democracy” that “deals with those excluded, but in a 
radically different mode: it focuses on their inclusion, as minority 
voices.”15 Here all minorities “should be heard, all interests taken into 
account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, 
cultures and practices respected, and so on.”16 In the process, what 
 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 See B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative 
Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799, 826 (2006) (“Indeed, GAL [Global Administrative 
Law] can be co-opted by powerful states to their advantage. While this is no reason for 
neglecting the development of GAL, it is important to understand the limits of this 
expanding phenomenon. GAL can, in other words, only act as a very limited tool of 
resistance and change. Even for this to happen, certain conditions must be present.”). 
12 See Prabhakar Singh, The Scandal of Enlightenment and the Birth of Disciplines: Is 
International Law a Science?, 12 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 5 (2010). 
13 See Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial 
Look at International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
OTHERS 265 (Anne Orford ed., 2006). 
14 Homi K. Bhabha, The Other Question . . . Homi K. Bhabha Considers the Stereotype 
and Colonial Discourse, 24 SCREEN 18, 19 (1983). 
15 Slavoj Žižek, How to Begin from the Beginning, 57 NEW LEFT REV. 43, 55 (2009). 
16 Id. 
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gets lost is “the position of universality embodied in the excluded. . . . 
What unites us is that, in contrast to the classic image of proletarians 
who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’, we are in danger of losing 
everything.”17 While a liberal notion of democracy welcomed 
decolonization, today neo-colonialism awaits the liberal democratic 
machine and the demise of postcolonialism. With the new age of the 
“war on terror” and the rise of nationalism in the Western world, 
international law is gradually being sidelined in the service of 
American foreign policy. This rigmarole, this Article emphasizes, 
could be captured within the epithet of “intimate enemy.” In order to 
prove this thesis, this Article discusses international humanitarian 
law, international economic law, and international criminal law. More 
precisely, this Article will take up “war on terror,” laws of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs), and the law of regional unions such as the EU 
and the AU to explicate the claims made. Across the board, this 
Article claims that an intimate animosity is on display. 
In what follows, Section I discusses the blatant breach of 
international law in droning Pakistan. Since the droning is not 
supported by any UN resolution, it is the United States alone that 
should offer the legal basis for the exercise. Subsection B, therefore, 
discusses the role of U.S. courts and scholars vis-à-vis international 
law. With the background set in this way, Section II discusses the 
psychological pull of international law, a fact that further stamps the 
growing affinity of the Third World and international law. Section II 
focuses on the Third World’s view of international law. Section III 
discusses the nature of international law vis-à-vis the EU. Section IV 
discusses the fallacy of the international law of humanitarian 
intervention using Afghanistan as an example. Western nations are 
largely interested in the suspension of international law at a time 
when SWFs are on the rise in non-Western economies. The 
withdrawal from international law by the Western countries to 
sabotage SWFs has been brought out in Section V. Section VI 
discusses the relationship between the AU and international law. 
Section VII concludes.  This Article invites scholars and researchers 
of international law to use “intimate enemy” as a new hermeneutics to 
unpack the real relationship of countries and international law. 
 
17 Id. 
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I 
THE HEURISTIC OF “INTIMATE ENEMY” 
I borrow the phrase “intimate enemy” from Ashis Nandy.18 The 
lens of “intimate enemy” offers an account of the relationship 
between international law and the Third World as the outcome of 
what Pahuja and Eslava put as “TWAIL’s characteristic double 
engagement with the attitudes of both reform and resistance vis-à-vis 
international law and scholarship.”19 The aim behind deploying this 
phrase in this Article is to capture a moment from the international 
law’s live-in relationship with the Third World. The desire behind 
importing this new lens of intimate animosity, to borrow Martti 
Koskenniemi’s words, “is not to write [a] ‘global history’ in which 
everything is visible—an impossible undertaking—but to diminish 
the power of blindness,” thereby seeing the future more clearly.20 
The evaluation of the Third World’s relationship with international 
law through the lens of intimate animosity, however, is not a value 
judgement. It is simply an effort at mapping the shifting realities of 
our times at a given moment, for instance, in 2012. Essentially a love-
hate courtship, the bond between international law and the Third 
World is in a state of constant flux. This affair is akin to the 
Stockholm syndrome: after a prolonged exposure to the Western 
technology of culture, Western education, and Western conceptions of 
international law, the Third World has began to sympathize with the 
erstwhile colonizers. It is this Stockholm syndrome of the Third 
World that has procreated the enigma of intimate animosity. 
Arguably, international law was the Third World’s enemy because, to 
deploy TWAIL’s central argument, it was used to justify colonial 
violence, slavery, and to acquire native land in all of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.21 
“It is now time,” Nandy wrote some two decades ago, “to turn to 
the second form of colonization, the one that at least six generations 
of the Third World have learnt to view as a prerequisite for their 
liberation.”22 Here lies the pull for intimate animosity of international 
 
18 ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER 
COLONIALISM 72 (1983). 
19 Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the 
Universality of International Law, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 103, 103 (2011). 
20 Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism, 19 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 152, 176 (2011). 
21 Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth–Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 5 (1999). 
22 NANDY, supra note 18, at xi. 
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law for the Third World. The lens of intimate animosity, when 
applied to international law, helps us re-imagine the modern West 
from a “geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category; 
in structures and minds.”23 
Europeans, Camus once remarked, “have preferred the power that 
apes greatness . . . whom [European] school history books, in an 
incomparable vulgarity of soul, teach us to admire.”24 Books are 
agents of knowledge, and the power that such books wield on the 
minds of people is all too well known.25 Colonization cemented the 
presumption that knowledge only flows eastwards. However, through 
corrupt science and psychopathic technology, the West has 
purposefully dissipated only information eastward. For instance, 
during the colonial rule in India, the British introduced a new system 
of education to create clerical support. It is doubtful that this system 
even aimed at arming Indians with the knowledge of science and 
technology to create scientists. By the time of decolonization, 
international law had successfully seduced the Third World with 
concepts like sovereignty. About sovereignty and the primacy of 
international law, Hans Kelsen says that the theoretical dissolution of 
the dogma of sovereignty is one of the most substantial achievements 
of his Pure Theory of Law.26 
By the 1970s, in the New International Economic Order, oil rich 
nations furthered their resource nationalism through sovereignty. 
Notably, however, with its intimate animosity, the Third World also 
runs the risk of copying the West with all its lacunas. Somehow, 
international law functions as a software that facilitates this imitation. 
TWAIL then becomes an exercise in separating knowledge from 
information and affirming that knowledge could also flow westward. 
In effect, TWAIL, apart from exposing some of the hypocrisies of 
international law, calls for a cross-fertilization of knowledge, ideas, 
and solutions for global problems. 
 
23 Id. 
24 Albert Camus, Helen’s Exile, in LYRICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 148, 150 (Philip 
Thody ed., Ellen Conroy Kennedy trans., 1967). 
25 See Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, 
Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47 (2009), for a 
perspective. 
26 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124 (Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulsen & Stanley L. Paulsen trans., Clarendon Press 2002) (1934). 
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A. Droning in International Law 
In September 2012, Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law 
came up with a joint report titled Living Under Drones.27 The report 
deals primarily with death, injury, and trauma to civilians from U.S. 
droning in Pakistan.28 It is the possibility of losing everything—for 
example, in the war on terror—that begs attention to the nature and 
effect of international law’s displacement of developing countries 
such as Pakistan. Droning is a question of jus ad bellum, the body of 
law concerning the recourse of force between two or more nations.29 
In any case, civilians must be protected within jus ad bellum.30 
The legality of droning depends on whether Pakistan has consented 
to the strikes or whether the United States is lawfully acting in self-
defense.31 Paradoxically, while the liberal texts and documents of 
international law, including the UN Charter, seek to work towards the 
inclusion and protection of minority voices,32 in droning civilians, the 
United States has been violating those minorities within a foreign 
state whose consent was not sought.33 Pakistan’s parliament has long 
 
27 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC (STANFORD LAW 
SCHOOL) & GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC (NYU SCHOOL OF LAW), LIVING UNDER DRONES: 
DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE PRACTICES IN 
PAKISTAN (2012) [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES]. 
28 Id. 
29 See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace After September 11: Axes of Evil and 
Wars Against Terror in Iraq and Beyond, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 281 (2005); Brian 
L. Job, Confronting Terrorism: Dilemmas of Principle and Practice Regarding 
Sovereignty, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 119, 122 
(Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2008). 
30 “If the goal of the laws of war is to protect all individuals in armed conflict, can one 
ever be on the ‘wrong’ side of the laws of war? The answer to that question from many 
international humanitarian lawyers is an emphatic ‘no’.” Mégret, supra note 13, at 265. 
31 LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 103, 105, 106; 3A C.J.S. Aliens § 1133 
(2012) (“Designation of foreign terrorist organization—Judicial review”); 74 Am. Jur. 2d 
Terrorism § 8 (2012). 
32 A very seasoned scholar and lawyer, Michael Riesman clearly admits this: 
“[E]xpectations with respect to the lawfulness of current or projected actions in the 
contemporary international political system are not necessarily congruent with the stuff 
with which lawyers ordinarily work, the formal texts of international law.” W. Michael 
Reisman, International Legal Dynamics and the Design of Feasible Missions: The Case of 
Afghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 59, 59–60 (Michael N. 
Schmitt ed., 2009); see also Yousef T. Jabareen, Toward Participatory Equality: 
Protecting Minority Rights Under International Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 635 (2008); see 
generally United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, United Nations, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r 
135.htm. 
33 Piotr Balcerowicz, Afghanistan at the Cross-Roads, 11/12 DIALOGUE & 
UNIVERSALISM 97, 98 (2001) (“The call to war against world terrorism should not mean  
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called far the end of droning.34 Clearly there is no state consent then.35 
However, droning could still be legal if the United States is found to 
have acted purely in self-defense as UN Charter 51 stipulates.36 
However, a neutral evaluation of pure self-defense is tough to have, 
given the pro-government bias of U.S. courts as seen in a streak of 
new cases.37 Also such claims of self-defense are not only arbitrary, 
but they also constitute an invitation to extraterritorial application of 
one sovereign’s laws over another. No doubt, the war on terror has 
not only stretched the very idea of self-defense—a justification that 
 
common responsibility of the whole Afghan nation. Would a Parisian during the World 
War II unhesitatingly approve of American carpet bombing of Paris and Rheims, 
undertaken in order to expel the Nazis or their Vichy collaborationists under Marshal 
Pétain? Any civilised European would have shivered with a twinge of resentment at such 
an action, because the means would have been in stark disproportion to the ends, because 
the individual lives of civil inhabitants would have been considered too costly, because 
alternative methods could have been envisaged that would lead to ultimate victory and, 
lastly, because the cities are considered world cultural heritage.”); see also Steven R. 
Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002). 
34 Declan Walsh, Pakistani Parliament Demands End to U.S. Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2012, at A8. 
35 The Living Under Drones report says: 
Some analysts, citing information released by Wikileaks maintain that Pakistan had, 
at some prior point, tacitly supported drone strikes. It is not known whether 
Pakistan continues to consent privately to the program today. Repeated public 
statements by Pakistani officials, which intensified in 2012—declaring that US 
strikes are illegal, counter-productive, and violate the country’s sovereignty—
clearly cast doubt on whether Pakistan consents to ongoing operations. 
LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 106. 
36 Id. at 103, 106. 
37 See, e.g., Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 13A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 
36:511 (Sept. 2012); Request for Comments on Effects of Foreign Policy-Based Export 
Controls, 52 Fed. Reg. 42663-01 (proposed Nov. 6 1987). Some of the cases under 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A, §§ 1602-11, are: Acree v. 
Republic of Iraq, 125 S. Ct. 1928 (2005); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 
S. Ct. 2859 (2009); Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848 (2009); Samantar v. Yousuf, 
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Republic of 
Sudan v. Rux, 549 U.S. 1208 (2007); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012). 
The spate of cases after the 9/11 incident, such as Khalid v. Bush, have upheld the 
President’s authority to capture and detain persons outside of Afghanistan.” Khalid v. 
Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, 
the court said that it is impermissible to inquire into conditions of detention under 
international norms given the President’s authorization from Congress to detain 
combatants. Id. The U.S. Constitution was read as ossifying any cognizable constitutional 
rights of non-resident aliens captured and detained outside the United States in the war on 
terror. Id. U.S. v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011) (holding that 
military commissions have subject matter jurisdiction); see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 
F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Executive Power v. 
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2006); John R. Kennel, Exceptions to 
Immunity, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 45. 
2012] International Law as “Intimate Enemy” 387 
exists by virtue of UN Article 51—beyond anyone’s imagination, it 
has also induced a breach of the principles of natural justice.38 The 
United States not only defines its reasons of self-defense, but also 
interprets all tacit talks to the military government of Musharraf after 
9/11 and current ductile Pakistani government as a form of legal 
consent within international law.39 The United States thus stands in 
the grave danger of not only undermining democracy as a concept in 
Pakistan, it also insults the will of the civilians in a foreign country, 
who often become victims of droning. Either from outside or from 
within, it is international law that is put to rest. 
Today, it is the innocence, alienation, and ignorance of women, 
men, and children at the Afghanistan-Pakistan boarder that is often 
called upon to justify itself in a situation where the international 
community, through NATO, has ensured a rainfall of bombs.40 Very 
ironically, while the war on terror in Afghanistan, which has 
subsequently leaped into Pakistan, has identified its most vulnerable 
victims—women and children—a senior advisor to Obama blogs 
about the President’s release of “the first ever U.S. National Action 
Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.”41 The White House has not 
only identified terrorists—a prerequisite of so-called “signature” 
droning of locations in Pakistan42—in the form of the U.S. National 
Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, it dons the garb of a 
savior of the women and children in these two countries.43 In his 
 
38 Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 42 (2002); LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 28, 
at 103. 
39 LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 27, at 106. 
40 J. Ann Tickner, Feminist Perspectives on 9/11, 3 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 333, 333 
(2002). 
The author “demonstrate[s] how gendered discourses are used in this [Afghan war] 
and other conflict situations to reinforce mutual hostilities, [and] suggest[s] that 
men’s association with war-fighting and national security serves to reinforce their 
legitimacy in world politics while it acts to create barriers for women. Using the 
framework of a post-9/11 world, [the author] offer[s] some alternative models of 
masculinity and some cultural representations less dependent on the subordination 
of women. 
41 Valerie Jarrett, Progress Toward a World Without Violence Against Women and 
Girls, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 5:06 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/blog/2012/08/10/progress-toward-world-without-violence-against-women-and-girls. 
42 David Zucchino, Drone Strikes in Pakistan Have Killed Many Civilians, Study Says, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/24/world/la-fg-drone      
-study-20120925. 
43 Wazhma Frogh, Is Afghanistan the Worst Place for Women?, GUARDIAN (London), 
Jun. 16 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/jun/16/afghanistan-worst-for    
-women (“What the world forgets is that Afghanistan has been at war, civil war, conflict  
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Savages, Victims, and Saviors, Makau Mutua attacks precisely such 
attitudes and politics of the United States.44 Mutua’s “savages-
victims-saviors” construction enlightens the larger ongoing politics of 
human rights. For instance, it illuminates the role of the Nobel Peace 
Prize and what its committee thinks are the victims to not only 
identify, but also to manufacture and, eventually, award the saviors. 
In her Nobel Peace Lecture, Aung San Suu Kyi commented: 
“When the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to me they 
were recognizing that the oppressed and the isolated in Burma were 
also a part of the world . . . .”45 Actually, she identifies all three: the 
savages, the victims, and the savior. It is because of her popularity in 
the West after her Nobel Prize win that she is being critiqued for her 
silence on grave human rights violations of Rohingya Muslim 
minority in Burma.46 The Rohingya are a stateless and oppressed 
people, and the government of Burma thinks they have no place in 
Myanmar and must leave the country.47 As Suu Kyi’s National 
League for Democracy looks ahead to elections in 2015, analysts feel 
that expressing support for the Muslim minority would be politically 
 
for so many years, almost all my life, and that is what has created chaos for women and 
shrunk women’s rights.”). 
44 Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 (2001). Mutua evaluates the human rights project as a damning 
three-dimensional metaphor that exposes multiple complexes. The grand narrative of 
human rights, for him, contains a subtext which depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, 
on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other. Mutua’s savages-victims-
saviors construction lays bare some of the hypocrisies of the human rights project 
questioning the universality and cultural neutrality of the human rights project. 
45 Her speech was remarkable: 
So for me receiving the Nobel Peace Prize means personally extending my 
concerns for democracy and human rights beyond national borders. The Nobel 
Peace Prize opened up a door in my heart. . . . We are fortunate to be living in an 
age when social welfare and humanitarian assistance are recognized not only as 
desirable but necessary. . . . When the Nobel Committee chose to honour me, the 
road I had chosen of my own free will became a less lonely path to follow. 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Lecture in Oslo City Hall (June 16, 2012), available at 
www.nobelprize.org /nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-lecture_en.html. 
46 Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma (2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3872c.html; DPA, About 75,000 Rohingyas in 
Myanmar Camps: Refugee International, THE HINDU (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www 
.thehindu.com/news/international/about-75000-rohingyas-in-myanmar-camps-refugee       
-international/article3948606.ece. 
47 Thomas Fuller, Internet Unshackled, Burmese Aim Venom at Ethnic Minority, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2012, at A4. 
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calamitous.48 Ironically, the same Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Obama soon after he became the U.S. President on the expectations 
that the Peace Prize would remind him of his duty as the savior.49 Just 
like Suu Kyi’s election in 2015, Obama’s second term in the White 
House depends upon feeding uncritical nationalism and Islamophobia 
during the war on terror.50 
B. American Scholarship and International Law Within U.S. Courts 
In the war on terror, the NATO-led assault has chosen the same 
social and political location to play the savior. It is in this connection 
that Salim—Naipaul’s mouthpiece in his postcolonial A Bend in the 
River—talks about the civil violence in Africa: “[I]t was 
extraordinary to me that some of the newspapers could have found 
good words for the butchery on the coast. . . . But people are like that 
about places in which they aren’t really interested and where they 
don’t have to live.”51 Clearly, Afghanistan is one such place where 
humanitarian-minded Westerners either don’t live or don’t have to 
live.52 Yet it is this not-so-liked place that has become the goldmine 
 
48 Alex Spillius, Aung San Suu Kyi Facing Backlash for Silence on Abuses, TELEGRAPH 
(Eng.) (July 26 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burma myanmar 
/9430518/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-facing-backlash-for-silence-on-abuses.html. 
49 Though in an apologetic manner, Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Lecture nonetheless 
talks of war: 
Still, we are at war, and I’m responsible for the deployment of thousands of young 
Americans to battle in a distant land. Some will kill, and some will be killed. . . . 
Now these questions are not new. War, in one form or another, appeared with the 
first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a 
fact, like drought or disease—the manner in which tribes and then civilizations 
sought power and settled their differences. 
Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture in Oslo City Hall (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama   -lecture_en.html. 
50 Ron Faucheux, Obama’s Second-Term Blues, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/20/obamas-second-term-blues/. 
51 Id. 
52 Wazhma Frogh, a gender and development specialist and human rights activist from 
Kabul, says that peace in Afghanistan is only possible through campaigning at the 
grassroots: “[P]eople have to own it.” But NATO’s policy is not to interfere in matters 
considered “cultural.” Its failure to acknowledge the rights of women is detrimental to 
building a stable society in Afghanistan. Pennie Quinton, Special Report: Why World 
Peace Needs Women, CEASEFIRE, Jan. 3, 2012, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/if-dreams   
-dont-scare-big-enough/. For a legal discussion, see John F. Murphy, Afghanistan: Hard 
Choices and the Future of International Law, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 79 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009). 
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of victims to ensure the production of saviors.53 The reality, in the 
words of Tariq Ali, has been the same all the while: 
There is widespread fury among Afghans at the number of civilian 
casualties, many of them children. There have been numerous 
incidents of rape and rough treatment of women by ISAF 
[International Security Assistance Force] soldiers, as well as 
indiscriminate bombing of villages and house-to-house search-and-
arrest missions. The behaviour of the foreign mercenaries backing 
up the NATO forces is just as bad. Even sympathetic observers 
admit that ‘their alcohol consumption and patronage of a growing 
number of brothels in Kabul . . . is arousing public anger and 
resentment.’ To this could be added the deaths by torture at the US-
run Bagram prison and the resuscitation of a Soviet-era security law 
under which detainees are being sentenced to 20-year jail terms on 
the basis of summary allegations by US military authorities. All this 
creates a thirst for dignity that can only be assuaged by genuine 
independence.54 
As a consequence, United States courts have to deal with a flurry of 
cases within its Alien Torts Statute.55 Since the United States 
Congress “has yet to state clearly whether tort claims alleging torture 
in U.S. custody should be allowed to proceed,” in Ali v. Rumsfeld,56 
the D.C. Circuit could very well have “arrived at a contrary holding 
that would have been more likely to elicit congressional input.”57 But 
it did not. The court took a textualist approach. Notably, American 
constitutional scholarship has recently been wielding its pen to arrest 
international law.58 Reckoning from the cases cited by scholars who 
favor the United States President’s and Congress’s unchecked powers 
in trumping international law, and the scholars cited in the judgments 
of U.S. courts in cases of detainees—usually foreign nationals—
 
53 My “production of saviors” idea comes from reading Baxi. See UPENDRA BAXI, THE 
FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 96–114 (2002); see also Thomas Poole, Book Review, 2 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 163 (2002) (reviewing Baxi). 
54 Tariq Ali, Afghanistan: Mirage of The Good War, 50 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 15 (2008) 
(footnote omitted). 
55 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
56 Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that U.S. Officials are Immune from Alien Tort 
Statute Claims, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (2012) (discussing Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 
F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
57 Id. 
58 See Prabhakar Singh, Why Wield Constitutions to Arrest International Law, 2010 
ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 16 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1719363. 
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arrested in relation to the war on terror, there is a strong symbiotic 
cross feeding to sustain each other.59 
Not only do the U.S. Congress, the courts, and some academicians 
today stand together to silence the voice of human rights and trump 
international law in the war on terror, they have also eliminated the 
doubts that shrouded the theorization of the world within the “clash of 
civilizations” epithet.60 A better example of a growing uncritical unity 
between academia, politicians, and courts is tough to find in any other 
country today.61 In the United States, even sovereign immunity has a 
more defined statutory basis under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act against a blanket immunity that international law mandates.62 
Yousuf v. Samantar63 epitomizes a gradual but unmistakable 
unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to engage with or even 
deliberately ignore international legal rules, materials, and cases, 
which it would ordinarily have. 
 
59 For example, most of the U.S. court judgments on the detention of detainees have 
cited Bradley, Goldsmith, Posner and the like. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F. 3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). See also Curtis A. 
Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 
(2006). 
60 See the controversial thesis of Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 
FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993). 
61 John Balzano, A Hidden Compromise: Qualified Immunity in Suits Against Foreign 
Governmental Officials, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 117 (2011). “The Samantar decision [of 
the U.S. Court] ended the circuit split over the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s 
coverage of individual officials, and has left the determination of foreign official immunity 
under the common law in a state of doubt. . . . It does not discuss the extensive amounts of 
U.S. and international cases potentially related to foreign official immunity that the parties 
cited in their briefs; indeed, it does not mention a single international law decision.” Id. at 
97. 
62 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008); see also Balzano, supra note 63, at 
77. In 1996, Congress amended 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a), in part by adding thereto a new 
subparagraph (7), which created such an exception with respect to certain suits in which 
money damages are sought by or on behalf of a U.S. national for certain acts of state–
sponsored terrorism. In Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 105–06 
(D.C. Cir. 2000), this amendment was applied. It dealt with a wrongful death action 
against Iran and its intelligence service brought by the brother of an Iranian-born U.S. 
national who was assassinated by the Iranian intelligence service. The court found that the 
murder of the decedent constituted an “extra-judicial killing” under the statute. See 
Michael A. Rosenhouse, State–Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign 
States and their Property Under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1605(a)(7), 176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002). 
63 Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
“The government has determined that the defendant does not have foreign official 
immunity. Accordingly, defendant’s common law sovereign immunity defense is no 
longer before the [District] Court.” Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV1360, 2011 WL 
7445583, at *1, *1 (E.D.Va. Feb. 15, 2011). 
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C. Comparing American and Indian Positions on the War on Terror 
The Western collective, this Article argues, is withdrawing from 
different types of international law (e.g., the UN and the WTO law) 
gradually. For instance, the United States wants a diplomatic 
settlement of anti-dumping cases after a series of losses,64 and the EU 
is happy to derogate from Article 103 of the UN Charter if it 
jeopardizes EU constitutional principles.65 In what Ben Chigara calls 
the short-circuiting of international law, as far as laws of war are 
concerned, powerful states “breach the foremost rules of international 
law and then claim that they were merely inaugurating new practice 
in aid of a new nascent norm of customary international law.”66 
Chigara analyzes the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq against the UN’s 
prohibition on the use of force.67 In an attempt to create an exception 
to the prohibition on the use of force, the United States claimed that 
they were merely actualizing the new doctrine of pre-emption.68 Thus, 
a custom’s potential to short-circuit international law is actualized 
“when states breach norms jus cogens and then plead new State 
practice.”69 Furthermore, a significant majority of American 
constitutional scholarship not only declares the project of 
international law unconstitutional law, but it is also breaking new 
ground in how to withdraw from treaty and customary international 
law.70 
The courts in developing countries, on the contrary, are groping 
toward international law in piecemeal ways. For instance, in 2010, the 
Indian Supreme Court held that India does not have any 
comprehensive legislation to generally define natural resources and a 
framework for their protection. Basing its opinion on international 
 
64 Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S. Zeroing 
Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 4, 2006), 
http://www.asil.org/insights060504.cfm. 
65 Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union, Judgment of 
The Court (Grand Chamber) Sept. 3, 2008. 
66 Ben Chigara, Short-Circuiting International Law, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 191, 191 




70 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010), for a discussion on 
this issue. See also Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(B)? A Reply to Bradley and 
Gulati, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 173 (2010) (“[T]he withdrawal proposal is premised 
on an analogy between treaties and custom given the apparent anomaly that withdrawal is 
sometimes permitted from the former but never from the latter.”). 
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law in the absence of a specific domestic law, the Indian Supreme 
Court said, “it rests upon the . . . principle of permanent sovereignty 
(of peoples and nations) over (their) natural resources.”71 In a loosely 
worded judgment, the Indian Court confessed the Indian intellectual 
property law to “be an exact copy of GATT and WTO.”72 Thus a 
genre of textual monism is already taking root in some of the fast-
growing developing countries. 
As compared to the existing robust debate in Europe and America 
about their less-than-robust respect for international law, one is then 
tempted to compare the American and European approach to how 
Indian police captured Kasab, the terrorist who conducted the 
infamous “26/11” attacks in Mumbai, and chose to try him before 
district trial court under Indian criminal law for “murder, conspiracy 
and of waging war against the nation.”73 From the time of his capture, 
there was an irrefutable case under the Indian Constitution for 
Kasab’s right to legal assistance and the Indian state’s duty to provide 
it. Kasab’s case is important to distinguish between the Indian state 
and the Indian judiciary. The Indian State (bureaucracy) is dualist.74 
However, since the 1980s, the Indian judiciary, which has the power 
of judicial review, is gradually moving to monism, as exhibited in 
over a dozen judgments. Overall, India is moving toward monism as 
far as terrorism and international human rights are concerned, though 
much more remains to be done. Thus, between Osama Bin Laden, 
Kadi, and Kasab, three jurisdictions’ real respect for the rule of 
international law is exposed. 
Now this might be counterintuitive to some. Nonetheless, this is 
the background for this Article; there is a kind of intimacy mixed with 
animosity that animates the lives of third worlders vis-à-vis the 
regime of international law. This Article invites scholars and 
researchers of international law to use “intimate enemy” as a new 
hermeneutics to unpack the real relationship of countries and 
international law. 
 
71 Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 S.C.C. 1, at ¶ 64 
(India). 
72 Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 308, at ¶ 45 
(India). 
73 26/11 Mumbai Attack: Kasab’s Trial, NDTV (India) (May 3, 2010, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/26-11-mumbai-attack-kasab-s-trial-22806. The New 
York Times reported: “Even by the standards of terrorism in India, which has suffered a 
rising number of attacks this year, the assaults were particularly brazen in scale and 
execution.” Somini Sengupta, At Least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2008, at A1. 
74 See Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470 (India). 
394 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 377 
II 
THE WORLD WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL VOCABULARY 
Albeit a law of easy virtues, this Article contends that, today, 
international law has become an “intimate enemy” to the Third 
World. However, one cannot jump to this conclusion without telling 
the complete story. Within TWAIL, international law has been 
perceived as an enemy of the Third World because of, as Anghie 
observes, international law’s colonial origin.75 Therefore, this essay 
will first discuss the nature of the relationship between developing 
countries and international law after 1945, the year the UN was 
established.76 
A comparison between the attitudes of international law and its 
officials towards the EU and the AU brings out the inherent bias of 
international law. International law has indeed been promoted as a 
civilizing force.77 Because of the abundance of resources, funded 
projects, and first movers’ advantage, European lawyers have been 
able to defend the EU’s breaches of international law. The United 
States clearly admits its breaches of international law as an example 
of exceptionalism.78 The American exceptionalism to human rights is 
also not hidden.79 However, Bradford and Posner reject the idea of 
American exceptionalism: 
 
75 See Anghie, supra note 6, at 739. 
76 The name ‘United Nations,’ coined by United States President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, 
during the Second World War, when representatives of 26 nations pledged their 
Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. . . . In 1945, 
representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. 
Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the 
representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. 
See History of United Nations, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). Representatives of the fifty countries signed the Charter on June 26, 1945. 
Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became 
one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into 
existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority 
of other signatories. 
Id.; see also J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119 (2011). 
77 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, 130 (2001), for an excellent exposition. 
78 See Nadine Strossen, American Exceptionalism, The War on Terror, and the Rule of 
Law in the Islamic World, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495 (2009). 
79 “The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to 
Americans. Too bad it’s not true.” Stephen M. Walt, The Myth of American  
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A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is 
an “exceptionalist” nation, one that takes a distinctive (frequently 
hostile, unilateralist, or hypocritical) stance toward international 
law. However, all major powers are similarly “exceptionalist,” in 
the sense that they take distinctive approaches to international law 
that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments 
with discussions of China, the European Union, and the United 
States. Charges of international-law exceptionalism betray an 
undefended assumption that one particular view of international law 
(for scholars, usually the European view) is universally valid.80 
Prior to expressing such a view, Goldsmith and Posner have said: 
“But international law as such has no special importance. . . . [A]s in 
other settings, Americans and Europeans have more in common than 
meets the eye.”81 One should not forget that post-1945, international 
law has always existed within the spirit of solidarity, and by flaunting 
the breaches of international law, first by the United States and the 
EU, and then by China, Goldsmith, Posner, and Bradford are only 
self-excusing breaches of international law by the United States. They 
seem to advocate that eventually all nations live in a self-contained 
regime and, depending upon the military might and diplomatic skills 
of the nations, international law is trimmed or allowed to flower. 
Basically, Posner and Goldsmith interpret international law in a 
positive fashion, as law between two or more nations, and not as a 
universal construct. 
In the war on terror, foreign detainees have received little 
sympathy from American constitutionalists (as well as the American 
courts), even though some claim that “the use of international law in 
constitutional interpretation [in American Courts], as one factor 
among others, is highly traditional and eminently proper.”82 Dennis 
Jacobs, an American judge, thinks: “International law is not all about 
 
Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011 
/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of 
U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147 
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
80 Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2011). 
81 Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Does Europe Believe in International Law?, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122757164701554711.html. 
82 Gerald L. Neuman, International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2006) (“Some international law is too important to 
the place of the United States in the world for our constitutional jurisprudence to ignore; 
some international law provides useful functional or normative insights on which 
constitutional adjudication can draw.”); see also William H. Pryor Jr., Foreign And 
International Law Sources in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 173 (2006). 
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human rights, conflict, and the overlaying of international consensus 
on domestic law.”83 
A set of nationalist American lawyers interprets the Presidential 
war powers as arresting international law unconditionally.84 Rabkin, 
for instance, opines that “American self-defense should not be too 
distracted by international law.”85 Also, the “[United States] Supreme 
Court has made it clear that both the President and Congress can 
break free of customary international law by simple decree.”86 Rabkin 
challenges the critics’ underlying premise that “international law has 
the same sort of claim on [the United States] government as domestic 
law and that war measures abroad can accordingly be judged in the 
same terms as police abuses at home.”87 A series of United States 
Supreme Court cases has also supported this position, more so during 
the war on terror.88 United States Presidents have stretched or violated 
international law at significant moments in American history, and 
international law has served as a political rallying point against the 
anti-terrorism policies of the Bush administration regarding the use of 
force, detention, interrogation, and military trial.89 
What is worrying in such a development is the dry realism that 
casts off the ideal kernel of international law, the celebrated value of 
the equality of mankind trumped by the calibrated approach of the 
supply and demand and the production and consumption of rules. 
A. International Law as a Psychological Pull 
The romance between international law and the Third World began 
with the colonizers’ cultural identification of the non-West as heathen 
 
83 Dennis Jacobs, What Is An International Rule of Law?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
3, 3 (2006). 
84 See Michael S. Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 
118 YALE L.J. 1762 (2009); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and 
International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 57 (2009). 
85 Jeremy Rabkin, American Self Defense Shouldn’t be Too Distracted by International 
Law, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  31 (2006). 
86 Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitutional Status of Customary International Law, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2006); see also Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis 
of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2006). 
87 Rabkin, supra note 85, at 31. 
88 See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (holding that 
the commission properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant); see also 78 Am. Jur. 2d 
War § 32 (2012). 
89 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 37. 
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and barbaric.90 According to Nandy, “Colonialism replaced the 
normal ethnocentric stereotype of the inscrutable Oriental by the 
pathological stereotype of the strange, primal but predictable 
Oriental—religious but superstitious, clever but devious, chaotically 
violent but effeminately cowardly.”91 
Writing in 1951, R.D. Kollewijn provides evidence to Nandy’s 
insights. He writes that, among all French and German colonizers the 
trend was towards non-recognition of the non-Western legal 
systems.92 During the seventeenth century, in the case of Blankard v. 
Galdy, Justice Coke’s sentence was mitigated as follows: “Where it is 
said in Calvin’s Case, that the laws of a conquered (non-Christian) 
country, do immediately cease, that may be true of laws for religion, 
but it seems otherwise for laws touching the government.”93 In 
Campbell v. Hall,94 Lord Mansfield expressed his displeasure to the 
distinction made between “a christian and a heathen kingdom”95 that 
Lord Coke had made earlier in Calvin’s Case.96 “Don’t quote this 
distinction,” Lord Mansfield interrupts the plaintiff’s counsel in 
Campbell v Hall, “for the honour of my Lord Coke.”97 
In that sense, modern colonialism, the vehicle of international law, 
“won its great victories not so much through its military and 
technological prowess as through its ability to create secular 
hierarchies incompatible with the traditional order.”98 Thus, 
international law came to the colonized world, such as India, with a 
 
90 See Prabhakar Singh, From ‘Narcissistic’ Positive International Law to ‘Universal’ 
Natural International Law: The Dialectics of ‘Absentee Colonialism’, 16 AFR. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 56, 62 (2008). 
91 NANDY, supra note 18, at 72. 
92 See R.D. Kollewijn, Conflicts of Western and Non-Western Law, 4 INT’L L.Q. 307 
(1951), for an early essay on this issue. “Without scrutiny of any sort, the laws of a non-
Christian State are estimated to be contrary to Christian principles and subject, therefore, 
to wholesale condemnation.” Id. at 310. 
A modern example of the conception that non-Western law is no law, is given by 
German colonial theory. When the imperial German Government, in the wake of 
private merchants and the trading companies, cast covetous eyes upon African 
territory, extensive estates were already found there, some simply occupied by the 
German pioneers, others obtained from African chiefs in exchange for cheap 
circulating mediums. 
Id. 
93 Id. at 310. 
94 Campbell v. Hall, (1774) 98 ENG. REP. 848 (K.B.). 
95 Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 ENG. REP. 377. 
96 Id. 
97 Campbell, 98 ENG. REP. 848. 
98 NANDY, supra note 18, at ix. 
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promise of emancipation from the local yolk of caste discriminations 
and other traditional forms of exploitations.99 To a very great extent, 
certain local social evils were uprooted as the British introduced their 
legal system in India. This promise of a new order ensnared the Third 
World though a “psychological pull.”100 
Since then, an internal bifurcation characterizes the lives of Third 
World states. International law, arguably, was the secular wedge that 
was put between the Third World and its traditions to allow 
developmentalism to enter.101 Here the insightful findings of M. 
Sornarajah are remarkably useful; in a purely legal critique of 
international law, Sornarajah establishes that international law is often 
kidnapped by powerful nations, among other things, through 
academic writings, which sometimes even trump the sovereign will of 
weaker nations.102 Talking about the state of international investment 
law, he says: 
A series of arbitral awards, followed by confirmatory writings of 
the so called “highly qualified publicists”, all of them coming from 
the so called “civilised legal systems”, held that . . . a contract was 
akin to a treaty in that responsibility of the state followed the event 
of the breach of the contract and failure to amend the breach. The 
use of awards of tribunals and the writings of “highly qualified 
publicists”, often mercenary participants in the litigation writing up 
their opinions or briefs as articles in “learned” journals, resulted in 
the creation of an international law in the area. The practice still 
continues. The members of the so called “arbitration fraternity” 
elevate each other in status, cite each other’s views and create law 
on the basis that they are “highly qualified publicists”.103 
 
99 INDIA CONST. art. 51, § 4 (“Promotion of international peace and security. The State 
shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and 
honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty 
obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another; and (d) encourage 
settlement of international disputes by arbitration.”); see also V.G. Hegde, Indian Courts 
and International Law, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 53, 53 (2010) (“For the Indian courts the 
first substantive encounter with international law emerges in the context of several 
territorial-related issues. The socio-political context forms the next phase, for the Indian 
courts to have recourse to diverse international legal norms relating to the environment and 
human rights and applying them as a persuasive tool. Later, the development context 
brings a complex array of commercial, environmental, and other related international legal 
norms into the Indian legal system.”). 
100 NANDY, supra note 18, at ix. 
101 See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996). 
102 See M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International 
Law, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 31 (2006). 
103 Id. at 31 (footnotes omitted). 
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No doubt this psychological pull worked well, and even since de-
colonization, a belief in the West’s inherent secular developmentalism 
has catapulted many Third World countries into a prosperous state. 
However, during this time, the West has unexpectedly suffered from a 
bout of illness: decline in overall prosperity, economic crises, and the 
loss of international hegemony with the rise of China. In about a 
century’s time, between October 1911 (the year of the Chinese 
revolution) and October 2011 (the year of an ever-deteriorating 
Eurozone crisis), Europe and China have swapped their positions: 
from being a keen lender, Europe has become a desperate borrower of 
capital. Consequently, Sornarajah contemplates, developed states 
might “dismantle to a significant extent the international law they had 
created to protect foreign investment and retreat into principles of 
sovereignty earlier advocated by the developing states.”104 
Thus, today’s cracks seem to have appeared in the secular and 
developmental wedge itself.105 Perhaps, therefore, Anghie says, “[t]he 
role of the Third World or developing country states in relation to the 
well-being and dignity of their own people is thus a subject that 
requires ongoing analysis.”106 Since it is now proven that international 
law was created to promote European commercial interests, this 
change in situation warrants an evaluation of the relationship between 
international law and the Third World and First World. This Article 
studies this new relationship though the lens of “intimate enemy.”107 
 
104 M. Sornarajah, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Existing Structure of the Regulation 
of Investments, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 267, 267 (2011). 
105 Alastair Ager & Joey Ager, Faith and the Discourse of Secular Humanitarianism, 
24 J. REFUGEE STUD. 456, 456 (2011). The authors argue: 
that functional secularism frames the discourse of contemporary humanitarianism. 
While in principal ‘neutral’ to religion, in practice this framing serves to 
marginalize religious language, practice and experience in both the global and local 
conceptualization of humanitarian action. Illustrated with examples from a range of 
humanitarian contexts, it is argued that the resulting discourse fosters a 
humanitarian response that is ill-equipped to engage with dynamics of faith within 
displaced populations. Humanitarianism needs to acknowledge the advent of post-
secularism signalled by many social theorists, and engage with greater awareness of 
the role of faith—both liberal materialist and religious—in addressing a range of 
issues of core relevance to the field: the clarification of core humanitarian values, 
the retention of a human rights framework able to define and protect human 
dignity, and appropriate means of addressing religious experience and well-being in 
the course of humanitarian programming. 
Id. 
106 Antony Anghie, International Law in a Time of Change: Should International Law 
Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 1365 (2011). 
107 Prabhakar Singh, Macbeth’s Three Witches: Capitalism, Common Good and 
International Law, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 47, 79 (2012). 
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B. Third World as a Legal System 
It is hypocritical that no text on international law adverts to th[e] 
practice of lawmaking for so many states and peoples by so few in 
an age in which there is much talk of democratic legitimacy. These 
trends were kept in check by the vigorous assertion of competing 
principles by the developing states in General Assembly 
resolutions. Yet, such alternative sources were dismissed by 
members of the “arbitration fraternity” as unable to create 
international law or as expressing ex ferenda. It is strange that the 
collective wishes of the states of the world solemnly expressed 
through resolutions of international institutions could not create 
international law but often uncontested arbitral awards and writings 
of a few “scholars” could create international law.108 
Sornarajah’s above views flag the reasons that led to the alternative 
view on international law from a non-Western perspective. What is a 
Third World? Baxi thinks, “Third World emerges through practices of 
resistance and struggle by the colonially constituted subject peoples, 
practices which offer the best possible readings of the critique of the 
European Enlightenment and of the universalising form of 
capitalism.”109 Offering an historical understanding, Chaliand notes: 
“The French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the expression (‘tiers 
monde’ in French) in 1952 by analogy with the ‘third estate,’ the 
commoners of France before and during the French Revolution—as 
opposed to priests and nobles, comprising the first and second estates 
respectively.”110 It “therefore implies that the Third World is 
exploited, much as the third estate was exploited, and that, like the 
third estate its destiny is a revolutionary one.”111 
B.S. Chimni, one of the most prominent Third World voices on 
international law, notes: “It is very often argued that the category 
‘third world’ is anachronistic today and without purchase for 
addressing the concerns of its peoples.”112 However, “too much is 
often made of numbers, variations, and differences in the presence of 
structures and processes of global capitalism that continue to bind and 
unite. It is these structures and processes that produced colonialism 
 
108 Sornarajah, supra note 102, at 31 (footnotes omitted). 
109 Upendra Baxi, What May the ‘Third World’ Expect from International Law?, 27 
THIRD WORLD Q. 713, 714 (2006). 
110 Gerard Chaliand, Third World: Definitions and Descriptions, THIRD WORLD 
TRAVELER, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/General/ThirdWorld_def.html (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). 
111 Id. 
112 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L 
CMTY. L. REV. 3, 4 (2006). 
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and have now spawned neo-colonialism.”113 Therefore, he proclaims, 
“once the common history of subjection to colonialism, and/or the 
continuing underdevelopment and marginalization of countries of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America is attached sufficient significance, the 
category ‘third world’ assumes life.”114 Thus, he unpacks the politics 
of vocabulary through which some actors deliberately try to dissolve 
the category of Third World. 
But there is a need to be alert to the politics of critique of the 
category “third world”. To misrepresent and undermine the unity of 
the Other is a crucial element in any strategy of dominance. From 
which flows the suggestion that the category “third world” is 
irrelevant to the era of globalization. It represents the old divide and 
rule strategy with which third world peoples are exceedingly 
familiar. Such a policy seeks to prevent a global coalition of 
subaltern States and peoples from emerging through positing 
divisions of all kinds. Thereby, the transnational elite seeks to 
subvert collective modes of reflection on common problems and 
solutions.115 
Sornarajah thinks: 
China, though not a state created through the processes of self-
determination, played a leading role through solidarity with the 
newly independent states of Africa and Asia in advancing the 
causes espoused by these states which, together with the developing 
states of Latin America, collectively came to be described as the 
Third World.116 
To me, the Third World is synonymous with destitution, poverty, 
and lawlessness in the backyard of civilizations, both Eastern and 
Western. Third World, to me, points to the state of living, material 
access to resources, political and social conditions of the subaltern 
groups, and the sluggish traffic of justice to the victims of faceless 
global capitalism and dictatorial communism. There are many 
examples of the Third World: the great continent of Africa and the 
country of Afghanistan are two.117 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 Id. at 6. 
116 Sornarajah, supra note 102, at 19. 
117 “Under current [U.S.] law, the legal analysis of targeted killings is straightforward: 
If we are at war, an American government may target enemy combatants and civilians 
directly participating in hostilities without running afoul of either domestic or international 
law.” John Fabian Witt, Op-Ed., The Legal Fog Between War and Peace, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/opinion/the-legal-fog-between-war     
-and-peace.html. 
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Writing in 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Korean lawyer No-hyoung Park said, “[n]o effort, however, has been 
made to recognize the Third World’s significant contributions to the 
development of international law.”118 He argues: “The Third World 
should be regarded as a single international legal system, separate 
from the individual laws of Africa, Asia and Latin America.”119 
Several reasons justify the consideration of the Third World as a 
single international legal system.120 The universality of international 
law, according to Park, “should be understood as developing 
inductively from diverse regional national laws. Thus, considering the 
international legal system as a three-system group does not undermine 
the universality of international law.”121 
Regarding the Third World as an international legal system would 
enhance the development of contemporary international law. 
Second, considering the global future, it is necessary to identify the 
Third World as a separate international legal system. The debate on 
the global future, whose central issue is to establish effective 
patterns of order, has been affected by the Superpowers’ fight for 
hegemony. The Third World should participate in this debate 
because without Third World input, the Superpowers may establish 
a world order that ignores the needs of many nations.122 
What is notable is that soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when 
scholars began to deny the existence of three worlds, Park’s advocacy 
fell by the side.123 Perhaps Park’s observations about “Jihad” were to 
 
Current international law purports to decide the question of war or peace by 
evaluating the intensity of the conflict. But in an age of mass destruction, when 
conflicts can go in an instant from zero intensity to unfathomable terror, the 
intensity measure seems ill suited to the work at hand. 
Id. 
118 No-hyoung Park, The Third World as an International Legal System, 7 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 37, 38 (1987). 
119 Id. at 37. 
120 Id. at 38. The author says: “First, both underdeveloped and developed nations have 
neglected the study of the Third World as an international legal system. In the study of 
international law, ‘Traditional international law,’ ‘Eurocentric international law’ and 
‘Soviet international law’ have been recognized.” Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). Park observed: “For example, a ‘Jihad’ or holy war is 
explained, not only by the cultural interests of territorial expansions but by the Islamic 
philosophy: unity of God, unity of mankind, and, the unity of religion. Hence, it is 
incorrect to assume that culture is irrelevant in international law and politics.” Id. 
Unfortunately such an example of “Jihad” follows his superb invocation and analysis the 
ICJ statute. Despite these observations, cultural values are relevant to international law. 
First, Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice designates the Court as a 
“whole representation of the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of  
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be proved historically wrong, as today the war on terror is effectively 
the war against “Jihad.”124 However, one should note what Chimni 
has to say about the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of 
the cold war: “Unnecessary importance is often attached to the end of 
the cold war.”125 The growing north-south divide is sufficient 
evidence, if any were needed, of the continuing relevance of the 
category “Third World.”126 Its lasting expediency “lies in pointing to 
certain structural constraints that the world economy imposes on one 
set of countries as opposed to others.”127 
Notably, humanitarian intervention in Third World countries, 
according to Fassin, “is a biopolitics insofar as it sets up and manages 
refugee camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access 
to war casualties, develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, 
and makes use of communication media to bear witness to injustice in 
the world.”128 And all of this happens at a time the United States has 
 
the world.”’ Id. Article 9 indicates that cultural values are indeed relevant to international 
law and the ICJ must consider the diverse cultures of nations. Second, the rules which the 
Court applies are not always, universal or culturally neutral. Often, “the Court . . . 
consider[s] whether there [is] a special custom in capital states giving states of the 
shareholders locus standi under the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that an established custom among a well-defined group of states is 
binding on all states in that group, except those states who consistently opposed the 
custom from its inception. Finally, “the premise that state interests which characterize 
foreign policy are independent of values or culture disregards the fact that state interests 
are not necessarily value-free.” Id. (footnotes omitted). However, lawyers are not 
clairvoyant pundits and wrong examples might succeed right analysis. 
124 Notably, a provocative advertisement—“In any war between the civilized man and 
the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat Jihad.”—that debuted in San 
Francisco made its way to New York subways in September 2012. See Hamid Dabashi, 
The War between the Civilised Man and the Savage, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:19 
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201292464012781613.html. 
There cannot be better proof of that fact that the war on terror is seen as the war on Jihad, 
as the timing of the advertisement points to; a High-level Meeting of the 67th Session of 
the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels took 
place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2012. The 
advertisement also has support from a U.S. Federal Court. New York’s Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority initially rejected it, but the Authority’s decision was overturned 
when a federal judge ruled that the ad is protected speech under the First Amendment. See 
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 11 Civ. 6774(PAE), 2012 WL 
3756270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012). 
125 Chimni, supra note 112, at 5. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Didier Fassin, Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life, 19 PUB. CULTURE 499, 501 
(2007). 
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been droning parts of Pakistan, which constitutes one of its many 
breaches of international law.129 
C. The TWAILing of International Law 
This leads us to the question: what is TWAIL? Chimni has written 
the manifesto of TWAIL that is worth ruminating over and again.130 
He makes six points that speak to “The Road Ahead,” that constitute 
“[f]urther thoughts on a TWAIL Research Agenda.”131 Makau Mutua 
has offered one of its most provocative and powerful definitions.132 
The long and the short of his opinion is that though the acronym 
TWAIL is new, the idea is not. Historically, international law is a 
“predatory system,” Mutuwa pens, “that legitimizes, reproduces and 
sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the 
West.”133 Thus, TWAIL first resists international law and then 
converts it into a reformist agenda. Today, TWAIL is on intellectual 
ascendancy. Using, if you will, a “social conflict” theoretical 
approach to the study of international law, TWAIL gives fresh ideas 
and adds new footnotes to the legal scholarship.134 
In advancing what has been a surprisingly reformist agenda, 
[TWAIL has] also helped to consolidate and institutionalise [sic] a 
political avenue that argues for the improvement of international 
law. Bringing to the forefront of thinking and writing on 
international law—issues of political economy, the cultural 
practices of differentiation, the uses of violence or the excessive 
exploitation of natural resources that have accompanied the 
expansion of the international legal order—TWAIL has become a 
virtual site from which scholars and activists can work both to 
resist, and to transform—or reform—international law.135 
 
129 See Chris Woods, CIA Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty, Says Senior 
Diplomat, GUARDIAN (Eng.), Aug. 2, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug 
/03/cia-drone-strikes-violate-pakistan. 
130 Chimni, supra note 112. 
131 They are: Increasing Transparency and Accountability of International Institutions, 
Increasing Accountability of Transnational Corporations, Conceptualizing Permanent 
Sovereignty as Right of Peoples and Not States, Making Effective Use of Language of 
Rights, Injecting Peoples Interests in Non Territorialised Legal Orders, Protect Monetary 
Sovereignty Through International Law, Ensuring Sustainable Development With Equity, 
Promoting the Mobility of Human Bodies. Id. at 23–26. 
132 Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31 (2000). 
133 Id. at 31. 
134 Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Law: Invitation to Study International 
Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 891, 906–09 (2005). 
135 Eslava & Pahuja, supra note 19, at 105. 
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Charged with umpteen counts of such allegations, where does 
international law stand today vis-à-vis the Third World? 
The mainstream international law is about the “state.” A state is 
assumed to have a sovereign character, meaning it is theoretically free 
in making its decisions. What does TWAIL have to say about the 
character of a state? TWAIL begins by asserting quite the opposite: 
states are inherently promiscuous and not sovereign. Sovereignty, as a 
concept, was invented within a particular historical environment. For 
mainstream international law, maintaining the façade of a state’s 
sovereignty helps to continue the old power structure. 
Naturally, then, an alternative conception of state leads to an 
alternative understanding of international law. Historically speaking, 
sovereignty was an expression of a political and commercial 
liberalism of, for, and by the Europeans. But when awarded to the 
non-Western states, liberalism within sovereignty, as a rule, addresses 
the individual’s egotistic indifference to other people’s plight. What 
else does the inherent liberalism of the responsibility to protect mean 
to the tribal and the rural population that is forced to welcome 
American drone visits through international law’s mandate?136 
Unfortunately, it is their innocence and disengagement that is 
unashamedly invited to defend itself. Therefore, TWAIL has provided 
us with five powerful observations. 
(1) [T]hat colonial patterns of thinking persist and continue to 
structure our international law sources and foundational concepts; 
(2) that the “civilizing mission” continues . . . (3) that racism and 
misplaced notions of cultural superiority continue to obliterate the 
contributions of and concerns expressed by non-Europeans; (4) that 
. . . notions of “class,” remain central to understanding our legal 
regimes; but that (5) contemporary forms of globalization have 
rendered geographically based notions of “imperialism” or 
“hegemony” overly facile in understanding the Gramscian forms of 
collaboration that now characterize the “Third World” itself.137 
The “intimate enemy” lens could very neatly magnify these five 
insights further. In his last article, the late R.P. Anand wrote: 
 
136 See Judy Dempsey, Europe Stays Quiet Despite Unease About Drones, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/europe/12iht-letter12.html 
(“Analysts say this approach is short-sighted. The United States intends to arm Italian 
surveillance drones in Afghanistan beginning next year. France has plans for military 
drones for reconnaissance and attack missions. NATO is trying to get member states to 
finance surveillance drones that eventually may also be armed.”). 
137 See J.E. Alvarez, My Summer Vacation (Part III): Revisiting TWAIL in Paris, 
OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 28, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer     
-vacation-part-iii-revisiting-twail-in-paris/. 
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“Although international law is presumed to be applicable among all 
states, east or west, north or south, big or small, it is only a recent 
phenomenon, not older than the United Nations itself.”138 Likewise, 
Martti Koskenniemi says: “While the legality of the bombing of 
Afghanistan was still an object of polite disagreement, the occupation 
of Iraq is almost unanimously seen as illegal—occasioning the 
response from across the Atlantic that if so, then so much the worse 
for law.”139 Not surprisingly, globalization has rendered 
geographically based notions of “imperialism” or “hegemony” overly 
facile in understanding the alliance that now typifies the Third World 
itself. It is because of this that this Article uses the “intimate enemy” 
lens to see international law. 
III 
THE EU AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
After the Court of Justice of the European Union provincialized 
international law in the Mox Plant case,140 it again expressed its 
preference for dualism in the Kadi case.141 Kadi 
 
138 See R.P. Anand, The Formation of International Organizations and India: A 
Historical Study, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 5, 5 (2010). 
139 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 
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140 See The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, INT’L 
TRIB. L. OF THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10 
/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf; Arbitral Tribunal, Dispute Concerning Access to Information 
Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ir. v. U.K. & N. Ir.), Final Award of July 2, 
2003; ECJ, Case C-459/03, Comm’n of the Eur. Cmty. v. Ir. [2006] ECR I-4635. The 
conflict between Ireland and the United Kingdom about the building and operation of the 
MOX Plant at Sellafield, on the Irish Sea, dates back to 1993. The plant is designed to 
recycle the plutonium produced during the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Ireland contested 
this project since the beginning and requested access to information from the UK about the 
plant in order to protect the marine environment of the Irish Sea. Both states are parties to 
the two treaties addressing the issue of environmental information: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention). In 2001, Ireland 
commenced dispute settlement proceedings under these treaties. Furthermore, it also 
applied to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for provisional 
measures that would restrain the UK from commissioning the plant. In this context, 
waiting for the final decision of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the UNCLOS, the 
ITLOS prescribed a provisional measure in December 2001, ordering the parties to co-
operate and to engage in consultations, including the exchange of information, without 
further delay. Ireland formally notified the Arbitral Tribunal of the withdrawal of its claim 
against the United Kingdom on February 15, 2007. See M. Bruce Volbeda, The MOX 
Plant Case: The Question of “Supplemental Jurisdiction” for International Environmental 
Claims Under UNCLOS, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 211, 218 (2007). On June 6, 2008, the 
Tribunal issued Order No. 6 terminating proceedings. See Ireland v. United Kingdom 
(MOX Plant Case), THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (last visited Oct. 20, 2012),  
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presented a high-profile and path-determining opportunity for the 
[European Court of Justice (ECJ)] to make its views felt in the 
current international debate about the extent to which human rights 
principles should inform the Security Council’s sanctions regime, as 
well as to develop its jurisprudence on the relationship between the 
European Community (EC) and the international legal orders in the 
novel context of the UN.”142 
“On both counts,” de Búrca says, “the judgment was a significant 
disappointment. . . . The result undermines the EU’s aspirations to 
develop a powerful international role premised on its distinctive 
commitment to international law.”143 
EU scholars defended the ECJ’s dualism as pluralism, adding to 
the recognized American constitutional dualism.144 Thus, even though 
 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6164. In Case C-459/03, Comm’n of Eur. 
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2006 E.C.R. I-4635. Ireland was condemned for bringing the MOX Plant dispute before an 
arbitral tribunal. See Nikolaos Lavranos, MOX Plant Dispute—Court of Justice of the 
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both the EU and the United States keep violating international law, 
there is an expectation of compliance from the African and the Asian 
states. This expectation is further forced into compliance through the 
responsibility to protect, seconded by the threat of force. As the war 
on terror evinces, to recall Albert Camus, “[i]t is . . . with cannon 
shots that Europe philosophizes.”145 In the times of shifting realities, 
there exists a love-hate relationship between the Third World 
countries and international law, animosity mixed with intimacy. 
Depending upon the nature of international concern, the intimate 
animosity grows or declines. This constitutes a gradual shift of 
positions between the Western and the non-Western countries in 
relation to international law. 
A. Reconciling International Law’s European Experience 
[T]he spread of the nation-state norm beyond its European 
homeland was . . . the result of coercive imposition by hegemonic 
western powers as an integral part of colonialism and imperialism .  
. . . The European state ideal and its key concept of sovereignty 
became a cornerstone of the global interstate system after the 
Second World War. . . . Furthermore, the Charter of the United 
Nations and its support for the principle of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity confirmed the centrality of the European state 
ideal.146 
The postcolonial constitutions have thus been framed in terms of a 
monist-dualist doctrine. Fresh from the bout of Stockholm syndrome, 
immediately after decolonization, the Third World states held on to 
sovereignty. Understandably, it was typical behavior of the newly 
decolonized non-Western states; sovereignty befell like a new toy in 
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their hands. A sense of nationalism that emerged from their protracted 
separation from their traditionalism during colonial intervention 
swept all of Asia and Africa leading to nationalization of foreign 
properties and investments. By the 1970s, the New International 
Economic Order led to a further assertion of sovereignty by non-
Western oil rich states. Europe also seemingly has come full circle. In 
the EU today, dualism has become the sole way to look at 
international law, though scholars are offering a pluralist defense for 
eschewing monism.147 
In 2006, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White 
observed that “[t]he [f]uture of [i]nternational [l]aw is [d]omestic (or, 
the European [w]ay of [l]aw).”148 And if we believe Camus, who says 
that Europe philosophizes with cannon shots, how good is this new 
European way of law? In the last article that professor R.P. Anand 
wrote, he observed: “Before the Second World War, international law 
was supposed to be not only a product of the European states and 
based on their customs and treaties, but applicable only among 
them—that is, European states or states of European origin.”149 Are 
Slaughter and Burke-White asking us to go back to this old position? 
To be sure, Hersch Lauterpacht, who invested all his life injecting 
domestic-law-type legality into international law, did not have the 
European way of law in mind.150 
When, in Kadi,151 the ECJ claimed to have created a legal order 
where international law could only enter after the EU’s permission,152 
Karl Popper became all the more important for the Third World. 
Wrapped in parochial nationalism, Europe, like the United States’s 
constitutional version, is offering a pluralist vision of international 
law that self-excuses both these constituencies for any derogation 
from international law. International law has thus been reduced to an 
agent of the West, employed or fired as and when needed. 
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B. Monism, Dualism and Pluralism: The Kadi Episode 
In its 1988 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) said, “[i]t would be sufficient to recall the fundamental principle 
of international law that international law prevails over domestic 
law.153” This principle, the World Court said, was endorsed by 
judicial decision as long ago as the arbitral award of September 14, 
1872, in the Alabama case between Great Britain and the United 
States, and has frequently been recalled since—for example, in the 
case concerning the Greco-Bulgarian Communities.154 
The ICJ strongly affirmed the sole role of states in the Barcelona 
Traction case of 1970.155 Human rights discourses since then have 
sought to change that view. In 2011, after the Israeli navy attacked a 
flotilla of humanitarian aid for Gaza and nine Turkish citizens were 
killed, Mansfield rightly argued, “[w]here states have failed to 
comply with international law, private citizens must have the right to 
instigate transgressors’ arrest.156” 
No doubt, the conservative statist view, as Kelsen identified in his 
Pure Theory of Law, is fraught with normative contradictions. 
Powerful states create more duties for individuals under international 
law as they offer fewer rights—it was clearly seen in the lack of due 
process in listing procedure that led to Kadi. If we want to empower 
people and cut down powerful states’ ability to justify violence in 
terms of inflicting punishment, like how it was done through the UN’s 
resolution freezing the funds of people without due process, then the 
ECJ’s Kadi decision is certainly welcome.157 
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In Kadi, on the one hand, Europe strives to protect the fundamental 
rights of a Muslim male alleged to have connections with Osama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaida. On the other hand, it signals to the United States 
its autonomist aspirations of establishing fair procedures in 
international law.158 Europe receives a lot of investment from the 
nationals of oil rich states, and perhaps in Kadi the ECJ sends positive 
signals to such investors—who have a guaranteed fair trial under the 
European constitutional scheme—that Security Council resolution 
1267 cannot take away. 
Under the everyday integrating world, Europe seeks an inversion 
of Kelsen; it’s the European law that shall guide international law and 
not the other way around. Kadi serves a powerful signal to all three 
constituencies: (1) to those Europeans who defeated a common 
Lisbon constitutional treaty, (2) to the Americans that run the show at 
the Security Council, and (3) to the rest of the world that looks up to 
Europe on the standards of protecting human and fundamental rights 
through the powers of a constitution. 
C. Provincializing International Law 
The ECJ has emerged as the sole generator of EU regional law, as 
seen in the Mox Plant case159 between Ireland and England.160 Mox 
Plant has been raised at three different institutions: 
1. at the Arbitral Tribunal set up under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
2. another Tribunal under the Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention), and 
3. within the ECJ under the European Community and Euratom 
Treaties.161 
The UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal held that “according to ‘dictates of 
mutual respect and comity’ it should defer the treatment of the matter 
until its implications under EC law had been clarified.”162 For the first 
time in the history of international law, a tribunal of higher UN order 
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waited on a regional European court to take orders.163 At the ECJ, the 
Advocate General Maduro found Ireland guilty of having gone to a 
UN body, and thereby bypassing the European Order. Mox Plant, in 
my view, was a preparation for Kadi.164 
Thus, the idea of international law’s interpretation is not a value 
neutral question, as many in West claim it to be. It is the value 
neutrality of international law that the United States and developing 
countries in general seek to question in plurality arguments made 
about the decisions of the ECJ. Kadi is therefore problematic, even 
though it does create some common good of protecting individual 
rights from the continuing war on terror. 
IV 
THE WAR ON TERROR AS THE TERROR OF WARS 
In a fragmented state of international law, Third and First World 
countries cling to different fragments of the law as the right law. As is 
well known, Article 1(1) of the UN Charter aims to “take effective 
collective measures” for the “suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace.”165 What is also known is that the 
Security Council has been busy blueprinting war plans in the “war on 
terror.” While, on the one hand, NATO, standing true to the United 
Nations’ spirit of taking “effective collective measures,” assumes the 
responsibility to protect, on the other hand, in Guantánamo and 
elsewhere, the United States is outsourcing torture and human rights 
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abuses to dodge legal volley and public protests that such an act 
would cause if done on the American soil.166 
The American courts have also moved from their position in 1980, 
expressed in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, that “even though the 
indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate 
the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially 
remedial as a violation of international law.”167 Perhaps the most anti-
international law judgment from a U.S. court came in the Citizens 
Living in Nicaragua case where, inter alia, the court said judgments 
of the ICJ “do not fall within the definition of jus cogens or 
peremptory norms of international law.”168 
The spate of cases after the 9/11 incidents, such as Khalid v. Bush, 
led the court to hold that the “[U.S.] President’s authority was not 
confined to capture and detention of persons on or near battlefields of 
Afghanistan.”169 Invoking the separation of powers doctrine, the court 
said that “it [is] impermissible to inquire into conditions of detention 
under international norms given President’s authorization from 
Congress to detain combatants.”170 The United States Constitution 
was read as ossifying any cognizable constitutional rights of “non-
resident aliens captured and detained outside” the United States in the 
war on terror.171 
It is this duality of international law that Kelsen attacked in his 
Pure Theory of Law. He penned: “International law is forced to 
undergo a complete denaturing in the notion that it is incorporated 
into the legal system of one’s own state.”172 Within the confines of a 
state legal system, “international law can no longer perform its 
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essential function.”173 This is precisely what we see in the “war on 
terror.” 
American constitutionalists invert Kelsen at this precise point to 
ensure the continuance of American hegemony and shirking 
responsibility for the civilian casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan in the war on terror.174 It then becomes clear that the critique 
of international law’s hypocrisy in its useful deployment by the West 
cannot be done in a legal vocabulary. Only through the lens of 
political science, sociology, and other disciplines can this injustice be 
magnified for all to see. TWAIL is a step in that direction. 
A. The Afghanistan Example 
Post 1989, the world stood witness to the horrors of terrorism, 
which many argue was the aftermath of the United States’s Cold War 
policies. This is true to a great extent. In order to avenge the former 
USSR for the Vietnam defeat, the United States armed the Afghans 
and bankrolled Pakistan’s military to fight the invasion of the 
communist USSR. After Russia’s defeat in Afghanistan, a political 
lull attracted Islamist guerrilla fighters to the struggle for power. 
America’s modernist intervention in Afghanistan enthroned the 
medieval ideology of the Taliban in Kabul. Installed indirectly 
through American liberalism, the Taliban organized a large scale 
lynching of women, televised evangelization of the administering of 
death in public places like football fields, banning of media and 
entertainment, annihilation of secular culture, and other unimaginable 
illiberalisms.175 The Taliban later offered hospitality to Osama bin 
Laden and company, with Pakistan recognizing the Taliban rule. It 
later became bin Laden’s laboratory and the cause for 9/11. 
The problem with today’s United States is not that it is a new 
global empire, but that, while pretending to be an empire, it continues 
to act as a nation-state, ruthlessly pursuing its interests.176 Something 
analogous to the outsourcing of jobs to Third World countries is 
taking place with the interrogation of terror suspects. Torture is being 
“outsourced” to Third World allies (those same countries criticized in 
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the U.S. State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices) who can coerce confessions without worrying about 
legal problems or public protests.177 
During this growth and nutrition of Talibani medievalism through 
modernist Western intervention, India received its own set of guests, 
trained on American money and weapons, Pakistan’s army 
establishment sent mujahids to fight for Kashmir.178 This led to the 
1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan.179 Soon after Pakistan’s 
defeat and its isolation within the international community due to the 
efforts of Indian diplomacy, Pakistan saw a military coup and the loss 
of a democratic government. In terrorism, therefore, it can 
conclusively be said that the United States is fighting the spectres of 
its cold-war diplomacy; it is a case of the U.S. history run amok.180 
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States declared the 
war on terrorism without caring much about its legality.181  India had 
high hopes from the United States-led campaign against global 
terrorists that emerged in the wake of the September 11 attacks.182 
From the arming of the Afghans against the former USSR to the 
efforts at disarming the Afghans in the war on terror, international law 
stood as a helpless bystander. Iraq need not even be mentioned. Yet 
many states sought international law’s indulgence manifesting an 
intimate animosity. 
Rarely has there been such an enthusiastic display of international 
unity as that which greeted the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. 
Support for the war was universal in the chanceries of the West, 
even before its aims and parameters had been declared. NATO 
governments rushed to assert themselves ‘all for one’. Blair jetted 
round the world, proselytizing the ‘doctrine of the international 
 
177 Id. 
178 Jessica Stern, Pakistan’s Jihad Culture, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 115, 115 (2000). 
179 K. Shankar Bajpai, Untangling India and Pakistan, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 112, 124 
(2003). 
180 Doug Stokes, Why the End of the Cold War Doesn’t Matter: The US War of Terror 
in Colombia, 29 REV. INT’L STUD. 569, 569–70 (2003). 
181 Ali, supra note 54, at 17. 
The current occupation of Afghanistan naturally recalls colonial operations in the 
region, not just to Afghans but to some Western myth-makers—usually British, but 
with a few Subcontinental mimics—who try to draw lessons from the older model; 
the implication being that the British were ‘good imperialists’ who have a great 
deal to teach the brutish, impatient Americans. 
Id.; see also Christian Tomuschat, (On the Application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State 
for Defence: Human Rights in a Multi-Level System of Governance and the Internment of 
Suspected Terrorists, 9 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 391 (2008). 
182 Bajpai, supra note 179, at 112. 
416 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14, 377 
community’ and the opportunities for peace-keeping and nation-
building in the Hindu Kush. Putin welcomed the extension of 
American bases along Russia’s southern borders. Every mainstream 
Western party endorsed the war; every media network—with BBC 
World and CNN in the lead—became its megaphone. For the 
German Greens, as for Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, it was a war 
for the liberation of the women of Afghanistan. For the White 
House, a fight for civilization. For Iran, the impending defeat of the 
Wahhabi enemy.183 
The end of the twentieth century has not put wars between nations 
out of fashion.184 Wars are businesses of profit and post-war 
reconstruction attracts investors with profit motives. The United 
States’s rise after Europe’s destruction in World War II is a relevant 
example. A decade into the twenty-first century, with the increase in 
the number of new sovereign states, the number of wars has only 
increased. Wars exemplify the symptoms of power with an 
understanding that every power structure is necessarily split. This 
crack is constitutive of the power dynamics; wars, as bottle-openers 
of the power structure, allow the aggressor to consolidate sympathy 
and thus more power though international solidarity. 
Meanwhile, the number of Afghan civilians killed has exceeded 
many tens of times over the 2,746 who died in Manhattan. 
Unemployment is around 60 per cent and maternal, infant and child 
mortality levels are now among the highest in the world. Opium 
harvests have soared, and the ‘Neo-Taliban’ is growing stronger 
year by year. By common consent, Karzai’s government does not 
even control its own capital, let alone provide an example of ‘good 
governance’. Reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or 
go to pay short-contract Western consultants. Police are predators 
rather than protectors. The social crisis is deepening. Increasingly, 
Western commentators have evoked the spectre of failure—usually 
in order to spur encore un effort.185 
Such wars are conducted on rules entailed as international 
humanitarian laws, and they expose nations’ intimate animosity with 
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international law. Unfortunately new graveyards continue to spring up 
around the world, filled with millions of men, women, and children of 
all nations. We, the people of the world, have not moved away from 
wars; wars have simply chosen to dig new graveyards to lay to rest 
people of different ethnicities, races, and nationalities. In their 
responsibility to protect—while humanitarian wars put an end to life 
with bullets, bombs, or air strikes—sepulchral trade wars, embargos, 
and the discontinuation of relief and aid administer gradual death to 
kids, women, and men.186 
B. Humanitarian Interventions as a Consoling Myth 
When Roscoe Pound came to deliver the Tagore lecture at the 
Calcutta University in 1948, perhaps it was with a sense of future that 
he remarked that international law “has conspicuously failed.”187 
Those were the last days of formal colonialism. Oduntan usefully 
reminds us that the bulk of African states’ interest in the International 
Court of Justice arose only as a result of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo crises—which accounted for six new cases between 1999 and 
2004 alone—involving five African states that have never appeared 
before the court.188 
All these new states had based their political and social order on 
constitutions embodying a variety of rights and duties for both states 
and citizens taken from the so-called international standards. The 
relationship of these new states with international law, as Paulsen 
vehemently advocates in respect to the United States, also became a 
constitutional matter.189 Decolonization was the historical moment 
where international law underwent a cosmetic surgery. All along the 
two Hague Conferences and in the formation of the League of 
Nations, the primacy of international law over state law was 
promoted. 
Soon after the non-Western states joined the bandwagon of 
international solidarity, constitutional law’s priority over international 
law became the new argument. However, we will do well to recall 
Karl Popper, who exposed Hegel’s double face on his idea of a 
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constitution quite unmercifully.190 Ironically, under his Prussian 
patronage, Hegel transformed the demand for a constitution into one 
for an absolute monarchy.191 Some American scholars, such as 
Paulsen, seek to repeat the same feat by trumping international law 
using a constitutional vocabulary. 
Today, while the Third World shows a growing affinity for 
international law, the First World has reduced international law to a 
consoling myth. While speaking about the responsibility to protect, 
the new avatar of international humanitarian law, Žižek confirms this. 
According to him, the public message of the responsibility to 
protect—to provide international security and to save the planet—is 
supplemented by the obscene message of the unconditional exercise 
of power: “Laws do not really bind me, I can do to you whatever I 
want, I can treat you as guilty if I decide to do so, I can destroy you 
on a whim.”192 “This obscene excess,” he thinks, “is a necessary 
constituent of the notion of sovereignty.”193 
There is also a latent structural asymmetry that the five permanent 
members of the Security Council seek to promote: “[T]he law can 
only sustain its authority if subjects hear in it the echo of the obscene, 
unconditional self-assertion of power.”194 Sustained by an eminently 
political choice, America’s less-than-robust affection for international 
law lies in its enigma of the very presentation of international crises 
“as ‘humanitarian,’ the very recasting of the political-military conflict 
into the humanitarian terms.”195 
Examples abound. As Žižek asks, although all the media were full 
of pictures and reports, why did the UN forces, NATO, or the United 
States not accomplish just a small act of breaking the siege of 
Sarajevo, of imposing a corridor through which people and provisions 
could circulate freely? “It would have cost nothing,” Žižek says, 
“with a little bit of serious pressure on the Serb forces, the prolonged 
spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous terror would 
have been over.”196 
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The situation was deliberately allowed to perpetuate a condition of 
humanitarian intervention. There is nothing human about such 
humanitarian interventions, then. Arguably then, TWAIL must 
interrogate the possible inconsistencies and splitting under the body 
of international law that “allow[s] the edifice of Order to maintain 
itself” in the guise of humanitarianism.197 
V 
THIRD WORLD’S INTIMATE ANIMOSITY AND THE FIRST WORLD’S 
SUSPENDED ANIMATION 
Today many non-Western countries, many of them Arabian, have 
been trying to invest in Western countries. Given the call for free 
markets and foreign investments, it is only natural that such 
investments are allowed. That is how many SWFs have come up. But 
there is an increased opposition to non-Western investment in the 
Western world. Most recently, a decision by “the French government 
to allow Qatar to invest millions of euros in France’s depressed and 
neglected suburbs has prompted concerns across the political 
spectrum about the motives of the wealthy Arab emirate.”198 
The outcry from the anti-immigrant far right was predictably loud. 
Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front, in a communique 
headlined “Islamic Trojan horse,” said Qatar’s decision was clearly 
linked to the fact that the majority of the population of the banlieues 
was Muslim.199 
Islamophobia, for now, puts international law on the backburner.200 
Even the political left in France is not comfortable with this. 
Demorand, from the left-leaning Libération, suggested the Qatari 
investment was the latest exercise in “soft power” and far from 
philanthropic.201 A similar fever had gripped the United States when a 
Dubai port wanted to invest in an American port, but it bowed to 
pressure from the U.S. Congress to sell it another American 
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company.202 In India, on the contrary, the government has announced 
a bold move to welcome foreign direct investment (FDI)—the FDI in 
the broadcasting sector is as high as seventy-four percent.203 The 
Indian Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh, has urged Indians not to 
fear FDI.204 Quite understandably, due to a protracted fear of 
terrorism emerging from the Arab world and the feeling in the West 
about a soft takeover of their economy by Arab countries goes against 
the very freedom of trade, commerce, and investment that the West 
has been promoting since 1945. 
A. The Curious Case of SWFs 
In light of these developments in two important jurisdictions—the 
EU and the United States —this Article contends that at the start of 
the twenty-first century’s second decade, international law, to borrow 
Nandy’s apt idiom, has become an “intimate enemy” to the Third 
World in particular.205 The Third World, somehow, appears more 
inclined in obeying international law. Both the West and the non-
West do not fully comply with international law. Even so, while the 
West is gradually moving away, the non-West is slowly holding on to 
international law. This counterintuitive psychological evaluation 
informs a complete role reversal between the West and the non-West 
vis-à-vis international law today. 
The rise of concerns against SWFs is a case in point, as it exhibits 
the intimate animosity of international investment law vis-à-vis non-
Western states.206 Yvonne Lee argues that the reversal of capital flow 
from non-Western countries like “China, Russia, Singapore and 
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United Arab Emirates” to Western economies such as America and 
France, “have raised the spectre of SWFs as smoking guns.”207 
International law, that has promoted free markets and an 
undeterred flow of capital as a harbinger of universal common good, 
has been shifting to statist policies to keep Arabian and other non-
Western capital out of their markets. No doubt, there are genuine 
fears of security and terrorism. What this proves, however, is that 
primacy of self-interest over such values as freedom of trade and 
commerce and free flow of capital have long animated international 
law’s universalism and liberalism. 
In this new reversal characterized as intimate animosity, while the 
capital-exporting, non-Western countries like China, Singapore, and 
United Arab Emirates are keener on keeping the freedom of 
international investment law alive, capital importing Western nations 
now seek to defeat their old arguments of protection of investments, 
universality of international law, and free trade as a universal value 
for the common good of mankind. 
Žižek urges us to drop the common cliché today about Western 
cultural imperialism suppressing the globe’s cultural differences.208 
Actually, it is quite the opposite; in the twenty-first century, Western 
cultural imperialism accentuates the difference since the West lives 
by promoting cultural relativity.209 Perhaps this explains why 
international law has now become intimate to the Third World. 
The “intimate enemy” lens also helps us evaluate Third World 
countries’ love-hate relationship with international law. For example, 
it explains India’s incoherent reaction to international law’s different 
regimes: the UN-led security regime, the law of the seas, the WTO-
led trade regime, the human rights regime, the climate change regime, 
etc. Today, not only does India see international law differently, but it 
is conscious of how it is “perceived by the world compared with 
1996, the last time it contested and lost to Japan” for the non-
permanent seat in the Security Council.210 
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B. The Suspension of International Law 
In this section, the essay contends that a club of global capitalists 
are interested in the suspension of international law.211 In the sections 
before, it was contended that the European and the American 
scholars’ demand that national law control the international law—a 
position Kelsen vehemently opposed. Be that as it may, within a state, 
irrespective of the ruling ideology, there is an inherent urge on the 
part of the Left, Right, or Center to suspend the law.212 Since the 
national policies control the international arguments, naturally the 
urge to suspend the internal law translates into an urge to suspend the 
international law. Such ideological spaces thrive on the way the 
governments of various states connect with the international law 
regime. Arguendo, an evaluation of the role of such ideologies in 
maintaining the rule of law is a worthy exercise. 
Subsequently, importing Žižek to international law becomes 
necessary. He opines that “the ‘Right’ finds it difficult to conceal its 
fascination with the myth of a ‘primordial’ act of violence supposed 
to ground the legal order; the ‘Centre’ counts on innate human 
egotism . . . ; the ‘Left’, as has long been discerned by perspicacious 
conservative critics from Nietzsche onwards, manipulates with 
ressentiment and the promise of revenge.”213 The global Left points to 
a third domain that belongs “neither to global market-society nor to 
the new forms of ethnic fundamentalism: the domain of the political, 
the public space of civil society, of active, responsible citizenship—
the fight for human rights, ecology and so forth.”214 However, as 
TWAIL has often identified the problem, “this very form of political 
space is more and more threatened by the onslaught of 
globalization.”215 
Against the liberal center, “which presents itself as neutral and 
post-ideological, relying on the rule of the Law, one should reassert 
the old leftist motif of the necessity to suspend the neutral space of 
Law.”216 This means that irrespective of the prevailing ideology—
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Left, Center or Right—a new group of Third World capitalists would 
join the club of the global capitalist class.217 No wonder Žižek finds 
“multiculturalism” as the new cultural logic of multinational 
capitalism.218 
In the legal vocabulary, “multiculturalism” could be replaced by 
“pluralism.” Thus, scholarly debate around Kadi can also be 
explained as the effort on the part of the EU to avoid its self-
destruction and invite capital to financially sustain the EU 
constitutional project.219 Even so, most of the transnational capitalists 
are interested in getting around laws, or even putting them under 
suspended animation. 
VI 
THE AFRICAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
CONTINUED PSYCHOLOGICAL PULL 
The forces of neocolonialism have constantly underdeveloped the 
African continent as a whole to ensure its continued Third World 
status. Ibrahim Gassama quips about the destruction of the post-
decolonized African continent in great detail.220 “It is time for African 
communities,” he writes, “to reject the perspectives and programs of 
the past . . . [and] transcend limitations of the past.”221 It is an 
apparent call to transcend post-colonialism. Since international law 
remains the sole way to organize the postcolonial lives of nation-
states, we need a lens that first calibrates the very nature of this 
relationship. The lens of intimate animosity helps us calibrate the 
precise state of the relationship at a particular moment. 
On July 8, 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest nation, 
the climax of a process made possible by the 2005 peace deal that 
ended a long and bloody civil war. On August 27, 2010, North 
Sudan’s president, Omar Al-Bashir, visited Kenya to attend 
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celebrations to promulgate a new constitution.222 He is facing two 
arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court (ICC).223 His visit 
extenuated international condemnation. As an ICC signatory, Kenya 
had an obligation to arrest Al-Bashir. 
A. Al-Bashir’s ICC Arrest Warrant and the ICC 
Kenya’s failure to do so drew criticism from both the Court and 
European governments.224 However, the Commonwealth Secretariat 
supported Kenya. Kamlesh Sharma, the Secretary General, said that 
the ICC must “understand Kenya’s multiple international 
obligations.”225 The Kenyan government argued that arresting the 
Sudanese president could have an adverse effect on the Sudanese 
peace process.226 Officials also said Kenya had a duty to the African 
Union, which instructed its members to defy the ICC and not 
apprehend Sudan’s president.227 
Responding to Commonwealth Secretariat, Christian Wenaweser, 
the President of the ICC assembly of states’ parties to the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, wrote a letter reminding the Commonwealth 
secretary of the standing of (1) an ICC arrest warrant in international 
law, (2) backed by treaty and (3) a UN Security Council resolution. 
Apparently baffled, Wenaweser remarked: “What was alarming to me 
was that [Sharma’s] comments seemed to indicate he agreed with the 
view expressed by the Kenyan officials that the obligation to the 
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African Union overrides the obligation to fully co-operate with the 
ICC.”228 The Security Council, Alvarez says is not much of a 
deterrent for the Sudanese head of state because “[t]he Security 
Council has, to date, ducked all pleas by the ICC Prosecutor to assist 
the Court in enforcing its indictments, even though the Council could 
easily do so under UN Chapter VII authority, including its existing 
sanctions regime for Sudan under Security Council Resolution 1591 
(2005).”229 Here Alvarez is egging on the Council to intervene in the 
AU at the cost of undermining an international legal process as 
enshrined in article 16 of the ICC.230 This flies in the face of the 
understanding of some AU members states that the ICC’s Article 16 
be used “sparingly and only when a specific threat to international 
peace and security could be identified under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and when action against such a specific threat would be 
exacerbated by proceedings pending before or contemplated by the 
ICC.”231 
B. ICC Article 16, Security Council and Sudan: The Politics of 
International Law 
Wenaweser nonetheless needs to consult some of the judgments 
from the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court; many of them discussed 
the derogation of international law by the EU and the United States 
before. The question is: what alarms him? Is it the disobedience of 
international law per se or disobedience by an African state? As such, 
the AU is frustrated over the Security Council’s failure to consider its 
deferral request.232 “Less than two weeks after the Rome Statute 
entered into force on 1 July 2002, . . . article 16 of the Rome Statute 
was controversially invoked at the behest of the United States”233 The 
United States threatened in early June 2002 to veto the renewal of the 
mandate of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as all 
other future peacekeeping operations, if rticle 16 of the ICC was not 
amended to its liking.234 
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Usually states party to the ICC self-refer the cases. In the case of 
Sudan—not a party to ICC, only to the UN—the Security Council, 
acting under its chapter VII authority, submitted the situation to the 
ICC prosecutor.235 As such, as Dapo Akande et al argue, “in a treaty-
based consensual international judicial institution like the ICC, the 
Sudanese referral constitutes a coercive and exceptional measure.”236 
Such a measure is justifiable only from the perspective of 
international treaty law if “it is a measure aimed at the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security under article 39 of the 
UN Charter.”237 The Security Council’s invocation at the behest of—
and under threat by—the United States points to the highly politicized 
“nature of article 16” of the ICC.238 Although article 16 of the ICC 
allows the Security Council “a limited power of intervention in the 
workings of the ICC, it was not intended as a means” which the 
Council might use to undermine the ICC.239 Such a situation, as 
Akande reports, has prodded the Assembly of the AU, and the 
African Commission, “to consider seeking an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice regarding the immunities of state 
officials under international law.”240 
Larger questions emerge. If the EU, as well as the United States, 
could trump international law, as discussed above, why can’t the 
African Union rethink its relationship with international law? This is 
not to justify any kind of genocide by any state machinery, including 
the State head. The question is about the political nature of conviction 
within international law. 
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After all, whether or not the Kenyan ‘“obligation to the African 
Union overrides the obligation to fully co-operate with the ICC”’241 is 
a matter of debate, just as it is within the EU as seen in Mox Plant 
case. As it is, the Sudan-Kenya part of the AU is an extremely fragile 
zone. When the larger prospect of peace is in deferring the arrest of 
Al-Bashir, which would be temporary, the Security Council should 
give peace a chance rather than just call unequivocally for Al-Bashir’s 
arrest. The exercise in international norm creation, such as the one 
done through the creation of the ICC, has been the single most 
important political result of international law’s project, which 
continues to misread the Third World states’ local needs. If the AU 
Assembly reiterates its request that the Security Council defer the 
proceedings against Sudanese President in accordance with article 16 
of the Rome Statute, it should draw the attention of international 
lawyers to a political turmoil that the arrest might unleash in the 
region. In any case, the United States, which controls the Security 
Council for all practical purposes, must not act to jeopardize the legal 
process for political mileage. The AU is doing its best to honor 
international law; it is the political production of convicts by the 
Security Council that wrongly portrays the AU as not complying with 
international law. International law’s intimate animosity continues. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States has 
decided to go it alone. Others are welcome to join in if they wish, 
and there may be advantages, but very little law, down that road. 
The Guantanamo base was deliberately chosen to hold al-Qaida 
suspects in a legal vacuum and has become a symbol of the US 
opposition to everything that might check its liberty of action—
from human rights treaty bodies to the International Criminal Court, 
multilateral disarmament to the Kyoto Protocol.242 
International law was never a Third World child. It was thrust upon 
the Third World through the process of colonization. Sovereignty is 
central to the understanding of international law. But as Anghie 
thinks, “sovereignty is, perhaps somehow inherently imperial.”243 It 
always seeks to expand its reach and power, whether internally or 
externally.244 Thus the “work of TWAIL scholars is indispensable to 
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addressing and comprehending these evolving complexities and 
shifting realities.”245 The lens of intimate animosity seeks to capture 
this shifting reality within the schema of international law. 
Today, the Third World has begun to accept the idea of 
international law. This creates a rather unprecedented situation when 
the Third World looks more interested in saving the project of 
international law than the Western collective. Much to the displeasure 
of Kelsen, both the EU and the United States have something dearer 
to defend. For the EU it is their yet-to-be-born constitution, and for 
the United States, it is their Constitution. Putting all speculations 
about the role of power in international law’s operation to rest, 
Paulsen reminds us that for the United States, its “Constitution is 
always supreme over international law.”246 He maintains: “To the 
extent that the regime of international law yields determinate 
commands in conflict with the Constitution’s commands or 
assignments of power, international law is, precisely to that extent, 
unconstitutional.”247 
Unfortunately, international lawyers “exist in a tenuous twilight 
zone between academic homelessness and practical professional 
insecurity.”248 While practicing international law, due in part to the 
discursive nature of law, lawyers do not want to transcend legal 
thinking. Sovereignty as a concept is also undergoing an 
unprecedented and severe change. Alas! Under the Western assault, 
international law is bleeding out its ability to see welfare as a 
common good at a time when NATO is handing down the 
responsibility to protect as a new humanitarian aid. If not more, at 
least in the responsibility to protect, we see the West philosophizing 
through force. 
Referring to Europe fresh from World War II, Albert Camus once 
wrote: “But the Europe we know, eager for the conquest of totality, is 
the daughter of excess.”249 It is no longer with hammer blows, he 
cautioned “but with cannon shots that Europe philosophizes.”250 Thus 
it is important that the norm-creating hypothesis of the international 
legal system “be reformulated so that support of a nascent norm of 
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customary international law could never be adduced alone as 
sufficient justification for breach of the system’s foremost norm.”251 
In other words, international law is waiting to be seen though an 
“intimate enemy” lens to capture its actual dynamics vis-à-vis 
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